Using a sample of established couples, we conduct an experiment on household decision'making. Individual partners first make a series of dichotomous choices between household goods and vouchers for experiences and then the couple jointly face the same choices. A random lottery device is used to incentivize the decisions. We find clear evidence of turn'taking as a method of resolving disagreements. In other words, when one partner wins one disputed question, it raises the probability that the other partner wins the next dispute. Given the arbitrary order of the questions this suggests that standard decision'theoretic models of household behaviour are inadequate and that instead, much behaviour might be concerned with relationship maintenance rather than the allocation of goods. Turn'taking may arise for a number of reasons. In one class of explanations, it may be a means of sharing the gains from bargaining over a sequence of discrete choices, especially when side' payments are not possible. From a non'cooperative bargaining perspective, (e.g. Lau and Mui, 2003) , it may also be a method for enforcing a Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. These explanations of turn'taking are intuitive and straightforward. However, there is a second notion that is less easily rationalised within a traditional 1 game theoretic framework, but which is also familiar from real life and readily discernible within the social psychology literature on household decision'making (e.g. Nock, 1989). In this version, against a backdrop of heightened emotions and deep vulnerability, decisions are used as a vehicle to exchange signals about understanding, mutual respect, love and so on.
Turn'taking is a well'known part of the story of how established groups make a sequence of decisions when there is conflict over the best options. If one person gets their preferred option in one decision, then it makes them more likely to yield to other members of the group on the next contested decision.
Turn'taking may arise for a number of reasons. In one class of explanations, it may be a means of sharing the gains from bargaining over a sequence of discrete choices, especially when side' payments are not possible. From a non'cooperative bargaining perspective, (e.g. Lau and Mui, 2003) , it may also be a method for enforcing a Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. These explanations of turn'taking are intuitive and straightforward. However, there is a second notion that is less easily rationalised within a traditional 1 game theoretic framework, but which is also familiar from real life and readily discernible within the social psychology literature on household decision'making (e.g. Nock, 1989) . In this version, against a backdrop of heightened emotions and deep vulnerability, decisions are used as a vehicle to exchange signals about understanding, mutual respect, love and so on.
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A central purpose of turn'taking is then to reassure and reward, to promote relationship specific capital (Becker, 1981) , what is often termed, (e.g. Stafford and Canary, 1991) .
Within traditional decision'theoretic models the primitives are the set of options and the preferences of the individuals over resource allocations. Allowing for a stochastic element to decisions, the pattern of choice should not be dependent on the way the choice set is presented or framed. Where group choice is concerned, many formal models also incorporate a preference aggregation component, but retain the choice set and preferences as primitives. Economic models of the household, such as the unitary model or collective choice models (Browning and 4 Chiappori, 1998) most clearly fit this description, but it also applies to a broader class of models from the consumer psychology literature such as the widely cited theory of group decisions offered by Davis, 1973 . Traditional game theoretic motives for turn'taking are entirely consistent with this framework. However, in the relationship maintenance story the pattern of dispute resolution may depend on the order in which the choice set is presented. Thus, if relationship maintenance is important, then a model of household decision'making based solely on the primitives of preference over goods can be flawed.
Although the relationship maintenance story of household decision'making may be appealing, direct evidence from actual choices is scant. So, in this paper we report on an experiment on a sample of established couples who were asked to make a series of dichotomous choices between widely available goods, first separately and then jointly. A distinctive feature of our experiment is that the choices made individually and jointly are incentivised using the familiar random lottery system. Though many choices were not disputed (i.e. the individual partners separately chose the same option), we find clear evidence for turn'taking in the resolution of those choices where individual answers diverged. Since the couples had the whole set of questions in front of them as they made their joint decisions, we take this as evidence against theories of household decision'making in which only preferences over goods matter.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows: in the next section we provide a brief background to the experiment and consider the relevant literature. In section 3, we describe the experimental procedure with results presented in the following section. Section 5 concludes the paper. Before going on though, it is worth making two clarifying remarks that anticipate our results.
First, much of the recent experimental work on individual decision'making is concerned with whether individuals are rational. Our paper has nothing to say on this particular issue for couples. One reason is that group choice models require a preference aggregation component.
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Since this component is undefined by axioms of rational choice 3 and can legitimately vary between households, it can be difficult to examine whether collective choice is rational or otherwise. One might still question whether it is rational for a group's choice to depend on the order in which decisions are presented. After all, many experiments on the framing invariance of individual choice are tests of rationality. Our contention is simply that turn'taking in ongoing groups can be rational, in part because the objects of preference are not confined to the consumption of goods.
Our second preliminary remark is that our design and our results do not presume that relationship maintenance is the only force driving household decisions. There is abundant evidence of the role played by power, expertise and preference intensity in household decisions (e.g. Corfman et al, 1994) . The aim therefore of the present experiment is to see whether turn' taking also plays a part.
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As we noted above, turn'taking may have different bases. Within traditional game theory, it may be part of equilibrium in a repeated game. Consider for instance the 'Battle of the Sexes' game depicted in Figure 1 . In this familiar story, the players have some wish to coordinate their actions. Two alternative options are available, each favoured by one person. There are three Nash equilibria: two pure and one mixed. In an infinitely repeated version of this game with two sufficiently patient players the Folk theorem implies that any feasible average pair of payoffs greater than (0,0) can be achieved in a sub'game perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular an average of (3.5,3.5) can be achieved by alternating the two strategy pairs (A,A) and (B,B 
In cooperative games, alternation may also be an effective means of sharing the spoils from repeated bargaining in a manner that avoids exit when utility is non'transferable. Suppose for instance that two individuals bargain in a relationship that may last indefinitely. Option A is always worth 3 to player 1 and option B is worthless to her in all periods. Option A is worth nothing in all periods for player 2, whereas option B is always worth 3. Each player discounts the future by 50% per period and present value of the outside option is always 2. In this situation, two periods in which the same player loses produces a net present value of at most 1.5.
Hence, even if they subsequently get their preferred option in all future periods, two periods without a win would lead to exit and the end of the game. Alternation is potentially sustainable, though and produces a present value of 4 to the person who gets their preferred option initially and 2 for the partner. 
Generally in this framework individuals wish to be kind to players who are kind to them and punish unkind acts with unkindness (Dufwenber and Kirchsteiger, 2004) . If not always pressing for one's preferred option is interpreted as kindness by the other player, then he or she may respond in a similar manner and turn'taking can arise.
Outside of game theory, much of the formal work on household (and group) decision'making rests on the theoretical framework laid out by Davis, 1973 . In this paper, Davis proposes that decisions are a probabilistic function of three components: the choice set, individual preferences and the "social decisions scheme".
5 Thus, as with game theoretic models the pattern of choices for a given couple should be independent of the order in which the choices are presented.
However, the framework initiated by Davis is quite permissive and thus it is not unusual to see decision history included as a variable in a Davis'style model of decision'making. For instance, Corfman and Gupta, 1992 argue that, "for groups that are not newly formed, the processes and outcomes of past decision are often important and should be included in models", page 54.
A predecessor to the Davis model that is closer to the game theoretic approaches is that produced by Polley, 1968 . In this model, too though the primitives are the choice set and the preferences of the partners. Polley introduces the notion of 'utility debt' to describe a situation where the resolution of recent disputes is such that one partner is ahead compared to a norm representing the long'term distribution of the gains from the relationship. The probability of losing a dispute is increased when a person has a utility debt to their partner and thus the model contains a mechanism that predicts turn'taking.
Relationship maintenance is a term that refers to strategies and behaviours designed to support and nurture a relationship. In non'mathematical theories of household behaviour the idea that 8 relationship maintenance is a key part of decision'making is common (Nock, 1998 (Rubin, 1970) . Turn'taking can be a component of several maintenance strategies. If the task is to make a decision, then turn'taking implies a shared responsibility for household choices. Turn'taking may also be associated with assurances: when a partner gives way on one choice it signals to the other partner that their preferences are understood and valued (Park et al, 1995) . Taking it in turn might also be linked to positivity and openness -since it enables the partners to exchange signals about preference intensity without at the same time signalling intransigence and an undiscriminating rejection of the partner's wishes.
In theory, there may be a reconsideration after all pending decisions have been examined once by the partners. However, sincerity and honesty are often valued features of communication in a long'term relationship (Rubin, 1970) . To reopen one decision after others have been apparently agreed may therefore send a damaging signal about the honesty of previous discussions. In short therefore, the relationship maintenance story is not simply about agreeing on consumption. It is also about the process by which agreement is reached, since this may affect each person's feelings for their partner. As such even when the consumption set is fixed, the order in which decisions are first considered can have an impact on the final pattern of consumption. It is this feature that distinguishes it from the traditional game theoretic model or the Davis framework.
Separating the relationship maintenance story and psychological game theory is less simple as psychological game theory is very close to the spirit behind relationship maintenance. One reason is that even within a relationship maintenance perspective, players may use feelings strategically, as Davis, 1976 observes: 9 'Waiting for the "next purchase" is an obvious approach if one feels that one will lose or "use up" goodwill by forcing a showdown on a contested decision. The husband can say, for example, "O.K., you buy the fur coat but I'm going to take the two'week fishing vacation with the boys." ' Davis, 1976 , page 256.
Moreover, psychological game theory is clearly work'in'progress and so it would be churlish to focus on the set of existing models rather than the spirit of the approach with its emphasis on beliefs about intentions as an important component of utility. For the purposes of this study, the key point though is that any psychological game theoretic model in which beliefs B i about intentions depend only on a) the final actions taken and b) the choice set from which these actions were selected, will not be compatible with widespread turn'taking in joint decisions.
Systematic evidence of turn'taking is relatively limited but comes from a variety of situations in which ongoing groups make discrete decisions. Ostrom, 1990 , then differed between households, were subsequently shown to the couples. For each question they were asked first to indicate their individual preference intensity towards both of the options and then to come to a decision on the item that they would choose jointly. Around 39% of the questions did prompt disagreement and in an OLS analysis of the probability of winning a dispute, Corfman and Lehmann, 1987 found a small but significant (p<0.05) tendency for partners who 'won' on one question to have a lower probability of winning a subsequent disputed question. The importance of decision history has also been reported by Qualls and 10 Jaffe, 1992 and more recently by Ward, 2006 , who used 61 US couples in an experiment closely modelled on that employed by Corfman and Lehmann. She also noted that decision history was more important for tasks where partners expressed strong preferences for one of the products.
One theoretical possibility with these results is that the partners were strategic in the first phasereporting preferences so as to maximize the chances of preferred goods appearing in the second stage of the experiment. One obvious counter is that the choices in the experiment were hypothetical which makes strategic behaviour in the first phase rather pointless. However, this then raises the issue of the incentives in the second stage of the experiment, wherein subjects were asked first to report preference intensity and then to resolve their differences. Another potentially confounding issue is the attrition of couples between the first stage of the experiment and the second. It is conceivable that these factors may produce turn'taking -the hypothetical nature of the experiment may produce heuristics that minimize decision effort for instance. Su et al, 2003 , use a conjoint analysis with three decisions. Subjects first rank the options in each decision, but unlike the other studies reported here, there is no selection of goods between stages and no attrition between stages. Thus there is no incentive to misrepresent preferences so as to influence the choice set. However, they use a mail'based survey so that monitoring of subjects was not possible and subjects were also therefore able to see all parts of the experiment before answering any questions. Because there are several options to rank in each decision, a simple test of whether partners take it in turns to win is hard to construct. However, intriguingly, they find that self'reported levels of coercion by partners are negatively linked to coercive behaviour in the previous decision and positively linked to dissatisfaction with the preceding decision.
Overall therefore, there have been a few experiments which have found turn'taking in some form or other. The lack of incentives, subject monitoring and other design issues means that in none of them is there a clear cut test of no'turn'taking when real choices are involved. As a result we design an experiment to avoid these possible weaknesses. The experiment takes place under our gaze with subjects separated for the first stage. The second stage of the experiment follows on immediately from the first to avoid attrition in the sample. Third, the tasks in the second stage were exactly the same as in the first stage. Fourth, all the tasks were simple 11 dichotomous choices, so it would be apparent when couples differed in preferences and when one person won. Finally we used a random lottery device to incentivize the decisions from all parts of the experiment. In other words, out of all the choices made by the couple one was picked at random to be executed at the end of the experiment. More details about the experimental procedure follow in the next section.
Subjects were recruited at two community events hosted by Royal Holloway, University of London, U.K. during the summer of 2007. The first was a garden party -a fair for the local community with craft stalls, food and entertainment; the second event was part of a nationwide heritage day in which buildings of architectural interest were opened to the public. Fifty couples took part in the first event and 32 in the second. On each day we set up a stall with advertising material and with posters listing prizes. We also handed out fliers around the event.
Couples passing the stall run by the experiments were invited to take part in the experiment. At this stage we did not know whether individuals were part of a couple, so we simply asked any passing adults if 'they were with their partner today'. If they answered positively, we probed further to see if they satisfied the criteria for the sample: were they both 21 or over, were they living together as a couple and had they been together for over one year. If they met the criteria and agreed to take part, they were given introductory instructions and descriptions of the prizes by the experimenters. Each individual was then asked to fill in separately the first part of the experiment which consisted of the individual choice questions (followed by a brief socio' demographic questionnaire). In order to keep the process gender neutral, 6 one member of each couple was labelled 'Triangle' and 'Wave' at random at the start of the experiment. On the questionnaire in section 2, their answers were labelled as such. Tables and chairs were set out to allow participants to sit down well apart from one another and the subjects were monitored by the researchers to prevent collaboration. If children were present, the subjects were monitored and reminded to answer the questions without their influence. Some toys were also provided to keep the children occupied.
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Appendix A lists the full set of goods used and appendix B provides a sample pair of questions.
The goods were initially selected on the basis of answers given by couples taking part in a previous experiment (Bateman, McNally and Munro, 2007) . They mix some low value goods with vouchers for popular retailers, some personal and household goods and vouchers for dating 'experiences' such as a meal and show in London's West End theatre district. This last class were bought from leading internet'based suppliers and are well'known gift purchases in the UK.
They are flexible and can typically be enjoyed at a variety of venues, within one year of purchase. Recipients cannot exchange them for cash. The prizes varied in face value from DVDs (retailing for around £10 or $20) up to some of the experiences which cost over £110 ($220).
In providing instructions for the first part of the experiment we did not tell the subjects the nature of the second part. We only specified that there was a second part and that one question chosen at random from their answers, their partner's answers or from the second part of the experiment would be chosen as the real question and their supplied responses would be binding.
We produced two versions of the questionnaire with the same tasks but in a different order. Each couple was randomly allocated to one version or the other (i.e. the partners in a couple always saw the same order).
After both partners had completed the first section we tallied their choices and transferred the information onto the questionnaire for section two of the experiment. In this section the subjects were jointly presented with the same set of questions from the first section and then asked to make a joint choice. So that there could be no issue of recall bias, the questionnaire included on it details of the choices made by both partners in the first section of the experiment. Appendix C provides one page of this section of the experiment. Once section 2 had been completed a random lottery device (bingo chips drawn from a bag) was used to select the question that would be for real. The couple was then notified of the relevant prize and the experiment ended. In fact all the couples were heterosexual in this experiment. 7 Prizes were ordered after the experiment and delivered to the participants in the following week.
13
After the first event two things became clear: first there was some scope for asking subjects to answer more than the 12 questions each of them faced; secondly and more seriously, for many questions there was a large level of agreement within couples (around 65% of all items).
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This limited the value of the dataset. Consequently we ran focus groups to identify more goods with a reasonable probability of disagreement and then replaced some questions and added a few more.
As a result, at the second event subjects were asked to answer 15 questions each and disagreement levels increased to around 45%. Apart from this the format remained the same. Similarly, Bateman and Munro, 2005, report an experiment involving choices between lotteries made by couples and find a much higher level of inconsistency than that found here.
For couples to be Pareto efficient, in instances where they have made the same choice in section one, they would need to choose the same option jointly in section two. Eight couples showed some evidence contrary to Pareto efficiency out of a total of 419 instances when both couples chose the same option (A or B) in section one of the experiment. Thus reversals of joint preference are rare, though not unknown and no couple reverses more than once. Again though, and perhaps because we are dealing with goods rather than lotteries, preference reversals are much rarer than the 15% incidence reported in Bateman and Munro, 2005 for instance. Overall therefore there is much coherence in the data.
Out of the 82 couples we have 380 disputed questions. The median number of disagreements per couple was 4 and the maximum number encountered was 10 (see figure 3) .
Although as would be anticipated, Triangle wins near enough half of all disputes (51.9%), across couples we have a wide dispersion of win rates. Figure 4 summarises this information, which excludes the one couple who did not disagree on any answers. Twenty'two couples split the wins 50:50, but otherwise there is substantial variation including 13 cases where one partner won all disputes. In six of these cases the dominant partner was male. Overall, women won 51.4% of disputed decisions.
As an illustration of our null hypothesis and test statistic consider the pattern of responses below for a sequence of eight questions. In the first question the couple give the same answers individually; in the second case they disagree and Wave gets their preferred option and so on.
Agree T loses T loses T wins Agree T wins T loses Agree
In this example, there are five disputes and T loses on 3 occasions. Out of these three cases where T loses, there are two cases when there is at least one subsequent dispute. In the third occasion that T loses, there is no subsequent dispute. So, given T loses a dispute, T loses the subsequent dispute 50% of the time, which is less than the 60% unconditional chance that T will lose a dispute. However, this is not the correct comparison. Once we know a dispute has been lost then given the total number of disputes lost by T, one degree of freedom about what can happen in other disputes is removed. This is most clearly seen in the case where there are only two disputes and T loses the first of these. The unconditional proportion of losses is 0.5, but the probability of two consecutive losses is zero. Essentially therefore we have to compare the conditional probability that the next dispute is lost, to the probability that another, randomly chosen dispute is lost.
More formally, let d = the number of disputed questions and let l = the number of disputes lost by Triangle and let k = the number of pairs of consecutive disputes lost by Triangle. For each of these couples we compute two proportions: P(L), the probability that the Triangle player loses a dispute, and the conditional proportion of disputes lost by Triangle, given that the previous dispute was also lost, P(L│L). Each of these calculated proportions includes a correction to allow for the nature for the sample. 
Here i is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the last disputed question is lost by
Triangle and 0 otherwise. Our hypotheses are then:
H0: P(L) = P(L│L).
H1: P(L) > P(L│L).
If there is no negative serial correlation and the null hypothesis is true, then there is an equal chance that P(L│L) is higher or lower than the first proportion. We therefore conduct a sign test on the difference between P(Loss) and P(Loss│Loss), with a null hypothesis that P(Loss) is greater than P(Loss│Loss) for 50% of the sample. The alternative hypothesis is that P(Loss) is more frequently higher than P(Loss│Loss).
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As could be seen from Figure Three , we have 1 couple with no disputes and 2 couples with 1 dispute. In addition we have 3 couples where the solitary dispute lost by Triangle is also the last dispute. We drop these 6 cases from our sample. In 54 out of the remaining 76 cases, (0.71) we find that the conditional probability of losing is strictly lower than the unconditional probability.
A binomial test produces z = 4.064, p = 0.000 (to 3 significant figures). For the separate sub' samples the relevant z scores are 2.47 (event B, n=30) and 5.33 (part A, n=46). Both of these have p values below 0.01. Thus we reject the null in favour of the alternative hypothesis of negative serial correlation in the resolution of disputes.
For small levels of disagreement, negative serial correlation might simply reflect the desire amongst a couple to equalize some measure of gains. Thus with only two disagreements we might expect Triangle to win the second if she or he loses the first. To consider this possibility we repeat the binomial tests progressively eliminating couples with low levels of disagreement. Table 1 summarises the results. We can see that the proportion where P(Loss│Loss) is lower than P(L) falls slightly as we exclude more and more couples, but that the result remains robust until the sample falls to just 26 couples at which the p value for a one'tailed test is 0.9504.
(There are 14 couples with 7 or more disagreements; the relevant proportion is 64% for this group.) Overall we conclude that the result is not an artefact caused by the inclusion of couples with only 2 disagreements. One theoretical possibility is that our results are driven by particular pairs of questions. As we note above, we have three different question orders across the sample, which makes it unlikely 19 that our results are simply due to the sequence of questions. Perhaps more pertinent is the additional fact that there are a large number of agreements within our sample, so that in many cases disputes are not consecutive questions. Indeed the incidence of the next dispute is spread across subsequent questions. For example, the largest number of disputes for a single question is 40 (out of 82). Only 16 of these couples then disagree about the choice for the subsequent question and out of them, one member of the couple wins both questions on 14 occasions. In other words, for this particular pair of questions, the data is at variance with the general pattern of results. For the remaining 24 couples, the next task where they disagree is scattered across the rest of the questionnaire. More generally, for the sample as a whole, in 45% of the cases where consecutive disagreements involve consecutive questions, the partners alternate who wins.
Where consecutive disputes are separated by one or more questions where the partners agree, 47% of cases involve alternation of the winning partner. So, in fact, taking it in turn is slightly more frequent for the pairs of disputes separated by some period of agreement, though the difference is not remotely significant. Overall, therefore we conclude that turn'taking is not an artefact of the particular order of the questions used in this experiment.
To analyse the data in a different way, we also run regressions, treating the dataset as a panel and According to the null, the probability that the joint choice in task t agrees with the choice made
by Triangle as an individual should be independent of how past decisions have been resolved.
According to the alternative hypothesis, the probability of success for Triangle should increase when Wave has been successful in the past round, once we control for Triangle's overall success rate. Thus a regression of Triangle on lags of itself, on Triangle's overall success rate and on
Wave and lags of Wave provides a framework for testing the hypothesis.
So, we estimate the random effects logit model: Where i refers to the subject, t refers to the question, Win Rate is the average number of disputes won by Triangle and Agree is a dummy that takes the value 1 if Triangle and Wave separately have given the same answer. We leave in Agree because of the possibility that individuals separately give the same answer but jointly reverse that decision. The error term, ε it = ε i +u it with ε i normally distributed and u it having an extreme value distribution. The null hypothesis is that b 1 =0; the alternative is that b 1 >0. We would also anticipate that b 0 < 0, b 4 > 0 and b 3 > 0. Table 2 summaries the results (the terms in parentheses are standard errors). For all the models, a null hypothesis of no explanatory power is strongly rejected, but an assumption that there is no individual level heterogeneity is not rejected. In other words, it is as if there are no systematic differences between couples that are not picked up by the Win Rate variable. Not surprisingly the effect of overall Win Rate on whether an individual gets their preferred alternative is positive and highly significant within the pooled sample and separately in the two sub'samples.
Similarly, when couples make the same choice separately, then this has a positive impact on the probability of that option being chosen. Again this is not a surprise, given that the marginal impact of the partner winning is negatively correlated with Triangle winning. Most pertinently 9 Since WinRate is constant within a household, we cannot use a fixed effects model. When we omit the WinRate variable and compare the fixed and random effects models, a Hausman test does not reject the random effects model against the fixed effects alternative.
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we see that if Wave wins in the previous round, then Triangle is more likely to win in the current round. The coefficient on Wave t'1 is significant at the 5% level, two tailed test for the pooled sample and significant at the 1% level for the second sub'sample. For the first sub'sample, the coefficient is positive, but not significant.
Since the choice of who is Triangle is random it makes no sense to include demographic features directly into the equation when they do not differ between the household members. When we include Triangle's gender and the age gap between the partners, as we do in equation 4, the coefficient on Wave t'1 is still significant, but the added variables have very low t values (i.e. the Win rate variable subsumes their explanatory power). Note that the sample is reduced for equations 4'6 because of incomplete demographic data from 5 couples.
It is possible that variables that are constant within a couple may affect the coefficients on the decision history variable. For instance, older couples might be more or less responsive to a win by their partners in the previous round. When we test for this we do not find any effect with age, children or years together as a couple. However, as shown in the final two columns, we find a difference between married and unmarried couples. For the latter, admittedly small group, there is no significant effect of decision history on outcomes. However, for married couples, there is a significant effect. Married couples take turns whereas the unmarried do not. We have presented a novel experiment on household decision'making. Established couples face a series of choices separately and then jointly; they are asked to make decisions over the same sets of alternatives. Using a random lottery device we provide incentives for them to take each part of the experiment seriously. We find firm experimental support for the hypothesis that there is turn'taking in the resolution of disputed choices within our sample. In common with Corfman and Lehmann, 1987, we find that when one person in the couple has won in a particular dispute, then it is more likely that the other person will win the next disputed question. We do not find evidence that turn taking is simply a result of any attempt to equalise the gains from disputed questions and we do not find any evidence that age or length of time together affects the propensity to take turns. However, we do find that married couples take turns more than unmarried couples.
These results present something of a challenge to traditional models of household decision' making in that the order that subjects see the tasks is arbitrary. Traditional models, both from economics and from consumer psychology, do not predict this pattern of turn'taking. As we have emphasised, however, our results do not imply that our subjects were irrational. Rather it may be that the strategies employed to resolve disputes were more concerned with relationship maintenance than in bargaining over goods.
As others have indicated, preference intensity, expertise and raw power are all factors that play a part in household decisions and these elements may swamp relationship maintenance at times.
As a result, the wider significance of our results is not clear. However, taken at face value, they suggest that models which attempt to predict household choices, but which are grounded only in preferences over goods may be inaccurate. Choices made by households may appear to be 24 capricious when viewed from without the relationship, when in fact they have a stable and predictable rationale when viewed from within. 11 Viewed alongside earlier work by Corfman and Lehman, 1987 , Su et al, 2003 and Ward, 2006 , these results also pose a challenge to the view that in close relationships individuals pay less attention to rules of fairness (Clarke and Grote, 2003) .
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Finally, we can only speculate about whether our results apply to other established small groups such as organizational teams and ongoing buyer'seller relationships.
Certainly, much of the literature on on'going transactions within business (e.g. Dwyer et al, 1987) would be compatible with a relationship maintenance motive for turn'taking.
11 Corfman, 1986 , makes this point when examining test'retest reliability of group decisions. 12 Following their experiments on fairness amongst primates, Brosnan et al, 2005 , make a similar claim for chimpanzees. They suggest that "individuals in close relationships (marital, family or friendship) follow communal rules, which do not pay overt attention to fairness and switch to contingent rule'based behaviour such as equity or inequality only when there is stress in the relationship." P. 257. Our results suggest otherwise. • Each question also first shows what you each preferred separately.
• At the end of the experiment one question number from 1'36 will be chosen for your household.
• If it is one of the questions from this section (25'36) you will get the prize you say you jointly prefer. 
